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China portrays itself as a Third World country that pursues "an
independent foreign policy of peace." Third World means that China
is a poor, developing country and not part of any power bloc such as
that around the United States or the socialist bloc formerly associated
with the Soviet Union. "Independence" means that China does
not align itself with any other major power. Chinese spokesmen say that
their country seeks peace so that it can concentrate on development.
China says its decisions on foreign policy questions derive from the
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty
and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in
each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
coexistence. The Chinese leadership originally enumerated these principles
in 1954 when China, with a communist government, was trying to reach
out to the non-communist countries of Asia.
Today, the Five Principles still serve a useful purpose. They offer
an alternative to the American conception of a new kind of world order
— one in which international regimes and institutions, often reflecting
U.S. interests and values, limit the rights of sovereign states to develop
and sell weapons of mass destruction, repress opposition and violate
human rights, pursue mercantilist economic policies that interfere with
free trade, and damage the environment. China's alternative design for
the world stresses the equal, uninfringeable sovereignty of all states
large and small, Western and non-Western, rich and poor, democratic and
authoritarian, each to run its own system as it sees fit, whether its
methods suit Western standards or not. Another Chinese term for such
a system is "multipolarity." The Five Principles explain why
America should not be able to impose its values on weaker nations. Thus
the core idea behind the Five Principles as interpreted by China today
is sovereignty – that one state has no right to interfere in the
internal affairs of another state.
China says it "never seeks hegemony." In the 1960s hegemony
was a code word for Soviet expansionism. Today Chinese officials use
the term to refer to what they see as a one-sided American effort to
enforce America's will on other countries in such matters as trade practices,
weapons proliferation, and human rights. By saying it will not seek hegemony,
China tells its smaller neighbors that China's economic development and
growing military might, will not turn the country into a regional bully.
Chinese officials' position on most disputes around the world is that
they should be solved by peaceful negotiations. This has been their view
on the war between Iran and Iraq, the struggle between Israel and the
Arabs, the rivalry between North and South Korea, and the conflicts in
the former Yugoslavia. At the U.N., China often abstains or refrains
from voting on resolutions that mandate sanctions or interventions to
reverse invasions, end civil wars, or stop terrorism. As a permanent
Security Council member China's negative vote would constitute a veto,
angering countries who favor intervention. By not voting or casting an
abstention, China has allowed several interventions to go ahead without
reversing its commitment to non-intervention.
Of course, these articulated moral principles do not mean that Chinese
foreign policy is not realistic or strategic. In many cases, the announced
principles actually fit the needs of Chinese strategy. Especially in
places relatively far from China, such as the Middle East, Africa, and
Latin America, a few simple principles actually reflect Chinese interests
most of the time. To oppose great-power intervention and defend sovereignty
and equality among states is not only high-minded but represents China's
national interest in regions where China cannot intervene itself. The
farther one gets from China's borders, the easier it is for China to
match rhetoric with interests. Even when there are inconsistencies and
tradeoffs in Chinese policy, the rhetoric is flexible enough to accommodate
them.
The consultant for this unit is Andrew J. Nathan, professor of Chinese
politics at Columbia University. The unit draws from Andrew J. Nathan
and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s
Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). |