Overview of Japan's
Postwar Defense Policy
"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of
the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international
disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,
land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never
be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized."
— Article 9, The Constitution of Japan (1947)
The above statement was written into the postwar Japanese constitution
by the American officials who headed the occupation of Japan. This constitution
is sometimes called the "MacArthur Constitution," because General
Douglas MacArthur, commander of all Allied forces in the Pacific, directed
its writing. The United States fought and occupied Japan primarily to
ensure that it would not go to war again, and Article 9 was written to
guarantee this. In 1947 General MacArthur envisioned a postwar Japan
that would remain disarmed and that would be overseen by the new United
Nations.
Changing American Attitudes Toward Japan's Defense
The American vision of an unarmed Japan living in peace under the supervision
of a world government was short-lived, however, because the international
scene changed rapidly in the late 1940s. Chiang Kai-shek, America's wartime
ally in China, was defeated by the communists and fled to Taiwan in 1949.
Another one of America's wartime allies, the Soviet Union, quickly came
to be seen as the greatest postwar threat to democracy. And in 1950 the
Korean War pitted communist forces in the Far East against a United Nations
force made up largely of Americans. Thus, by 1950 when John Foster Dulles
was appointed to begin negotiating a peace treaty with Japan to conclude
the American occupation, he and most other American policy makers had
come to see Japan as very important to the defense of American interests
and democracy in the Far East.
In negotiating the peace treaty that would end the occupation and return
political control to the Japanese government, Dulles also sought to pressure
the Japanese to rearm and to conduct a military alliance with the United
States. Although most of the allied countries signed the treaty, which
was presented at San Francisco in 1951, several Asian states did not,
including the new People's Republic of China (whose representatives were
not invited to the conference) and the Soviet Union.
Rearmament
Ironically, by the end of the occupation it was the Americans who were
pressing for Japanese rearmament while the Japanese government resisted
rearmament in the name of the American-inspired constitution. Dulles
encouraged Japan to rearm itself in order to become an effective military
ally of the United States, but the Japanese were very reluctant, as many
remained shocked by the devastation of the war. The Japanese finally
agreed, however, to the minimum compromise that the Americans would accept,
which was the creation of a "National Police Reserve," a paramilitary
force of 75,000 to defend the Japanese islands.
The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
In 1952 the United States Congress ratified the peace treaty that formally
ended the American occupation of Japan. Simultaneously it ratified the "U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty." This treaty allowed the American military to continue
to use important bases in Japan for the defense of the Far East and to
intervene in Japan to put down internal disturbances should the Japanese
government request such assistance. While the Japanese government and
a majority of the public supported the ratification of the new treaty,
a sizable portion of the public did not. Even many pro-American conservative
Japanese felt that the treaty compromised Japan's independence. Having
negotiated this security treaty while under American occupation, however,
Japan had little influence over its terms.
Japan's Political Division Over Defense
While international events were shaping American attitudes toward Japan's
strategic importance, domestic events were reshaping Japanese thinking.
Throughout the 1950s, there was strife over the security treaty with
the United States and the continued presence of American soldiers in
Japan. This conflict paralleled other political problems that pitted
the political left and right against one another.
In the middle were the moderate conservatives, representing particularly
the business, rural and bureaucratic sectors, which made up a majority
of the country. They supported the creation of modest Self-Defense Forces,
but preferred to entrust the primary responsibility for the military
security of the country to the United States, so that Japan could concentrate
on economic recovery.
On the right were the nationalists, who supported the U.S. alliance,
but favored a stronger military posture and greater independence from
the United States in foreign affairs. They were also generally dissatisfied
with the liberal "MacArthur Constitution," because they felt
that it was imposed upon Japan from outside, and because it renounced
Japan's sovereign right to wage war. The constitution also lowered the
position of the emperor; weakened state control of education, local government,
and political expression; and supported labor unions and other institutions
that the conservatives opposed.
Opposing the moderate conservatives and the right wing nationalists
were the labor unions and the socialist and communist parties on the
left. These groups had been suppressed by the wartime military regime,
but they greatly benefited under the new constitution. The left wing
felt that the alliance with the United States might result in Japan becoming
drawn into a conflict peripheral to Japanese interests. For the socialists,
peace could only be ensured by complete neutrality and passivism in foreign
affairs.
Conflict and Compromise Over Defense Policy
Throughout much of the postwar period the socialist and communist parties
maintained enough popular support to achieve the necessary one-third
of the Diet votes to block any reform of the Japanese constitution. However,
the conservative Liberal Democratic party (LDP) controlled the government
for most of this time. The LDP, which includes some right-wing nationalists
as well as a larger group of cautious, pro-American conservatives, developed
a pragmatic policy of limited rearmament under the protection afforded
by a close relationship with the United States. This policy was continually
attacked by both the right and the left and even came under pressure
from the United States, but for many years it was the prevailing policy
in Japan.
In May 1960, conflict over Japan's defense policy brought about one
of the greatest political crises in the postwar period. The security
treaty was central to the LDP's defense policy, but it was not entirely
satisfactory to the conservatives. The treaty did not allow Japan any
control over how American soldiers based in Japan were to be used — whether
overseas, for purely American interests, or in Japan, to put down domestic
disturbances. The Japanese government sought a more equal treaty — a
treaty of "mutual defense" — that would confer benefits
more equally on both sides. The Japanese put this issue before the Americans
in l958, and negotiated and signed a new treaty in 1960. The most important
changes were the U.S. commitment to defend Japan in the event that Japan
was attacked, the provision that Japan would be consulted before the
United States moved major forces into or out of the country, and the
clause allowing either side to end the treaty after 1970 with one year's
notice.
While these changes were important, many Japanese were still not satisfied,
and many opposed any military alliance with the United States. The LDP
passed the treaty revision at a special midnight session at which the
minority Socialist members were not present. This angered many Japanese
and there were mass protests in the streets and in the Diet buildings.
These protests were so large and unruly that President Eisenhower was
forced to cancel a state visit intended to celebrate cooperation between
the two countries. The new treaty automatically received Upper House
diet approval a few weeks later, but the battle eventually led to the
resignation of Prime Minister Kishi.
Despite the continuing opposition of some Japanese to Japan's alliance
with the United States, public hostility to the treaty lessened after
1960 and the treaty was not abrogated in 1970.
By the beginning of the 1980's most opposition parties had come to support
the U.S.-Japan alliance. Today the United States government continues
to believe that its military bases in Japan are essential for the U.S.
forward line of defense in Asia, and the Japanese government continues
to view these bases as essential for the protection of Japan. The Japanese
government pays a substantial portion of the expenses for U.S. military
bases in Japan.
The Self-Defense Forces
Although conservative Japanese remain dissatisfied with Article 9 of
the constitution, which renounces Japan's right to maintain military
forces, vigorous opposition by the left and among the public has prevented
the amendment of Article 9. It remains the basis of Japanese defense
policy.
Japan does, nonetheless, maintain men under arms, because Article 9
has been interpreted to mean that it is acceptable to maintain purely
defensive military forces, with no offensive capability. Japan's Supreme
Court has refused to overrule this interpretation. In 1954, the Diet
established a "Self-Defense Agency" which converted the "National
Police Reserve" into the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense
Forces. The original bill provided for a force of 150,000, but this number
has been slowly expanded to 270,000 — a relatively small force
compared with those of any of Japan's regional neighbors, such as Taiwan,
the two Koreas, or China. Its deterrent purpose and modest capability
is reflected in the prohibition of the ground forces from operating overseas.
Complete self-defense against major threats would require a much larger,
better equipped force, which would probably strain the existing political
compromise and popular acceptance of the Self-Defense Forces. Under present
circumstances it would also likely cause apprehension among Japan's neighbors.
Japan's "Nuclear Allergy"
While there has been growing acceptance of the American alliance and
the Self-Defense Forces, nuclear weapons are still taboo in Japan today.
As the only people in the world to have been attacked with nuclear weapons,
the Japanese have a special aversion to them — they call it their "nuclear
allergy." Although Japan's high level of technology would allow
easy development of nuclear weapons, even the most conservative governments
have supported the "three nuclear principles," which prohibit
the introduction, storage, and use of nuclear weapons.
On the other hand, the Japanese government appreciates, especially after
the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the need to deter potential
opponents from using nuclear weapons against it. For this it relies on
the strategic arsenal of the United States, represented particularly
by the 7th Fleet; and the public, while uneasy about the visits of the
7th Fleet to Japanese ports, has come increasingly to accept them.
Japanese and American Attitudes Today
Fears about rearmament remain strong in Japan. Opinion polls show that
the majority of Japanese support the Self-Defense Forces but do not wish
them to be enlarged. Each August, at ceremonies at Japan's National Memorial
to the Dead, which honors those who died in World War II, there is great
controversy between the left and the right over the government's official
participation. Fear of militarism and of war is still strong in Japan
today. Many Japanese feel that the lesson of World War II is that reliance
on military power is self-defeating. They also fear that a strong military
cannot be controlled and would ultimately destroy democracy.
Having been the victors in World War II, Americans are more concerned
with the problems of the present than with the lessons of the past. Japan
has become one of the most powerful economies in the world. As Japan's
economy continues to grow and its manufactured exports compete with and
sometimes take markets away from American industries, many Americans
have begun to feel that Japan should accept more of the burden of maintaining
stability in the world. Together with the growth of Japanese power and
increasing problems of trade have come American demands that Japan begin
to accept responsibility for the defense of its own islands and the waters
surrounding them.
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